New Jersey’s Slayer Statute
In February 2007, Tess Damm’s boyfriend, Bryan Grove, choked and stabbed Damm’s fifty-two-year-old mother, Linda, to death. After Grove committed the crime, Tess and her boyfriend lived in the house for three weeks. After several failed attempts to hide the body, they recruited a friend to help stuff it in the back of Linda’s own Subaru. Linda’s body was not discovered for nearly a month. Now, over two years after the slaying, Tess Damm is demanding her inheritance.
Like most states, Colorado employs a “slayer” rule that prevents a killer from inheriting from the person he has slain. Though these statutory and common law slayer rules vary in detail, they are consistently challenged in court. In Tess Damm’s case, though the Colorado statute specifies that a felonious killing bars an individual’s right to intestate succession, her lawyers argue that, as a minor, she was unable to form the requisite intent for a felonious murder.
Under New Jersey’s slayer statute, it may be even easier to make an argument on behalf of the murderess. The New Jersey statute bars succession when the killing is “intentional” but does not provide a technical definition that would enable courts to properly determine when a killing is sufficient to trigger the statute. This Note examines how this ambiguity, latent in the construction of the statute, creates confusion, risks inconsistent application of justice, and undermines the very laws of equity in which the statute is based.
Part II traces the roots of the slayer statute to common law principles of equity, examining the moral basis upon which it is predicated. Part III includes a close reading of the New Jersey slayer statute, with a focus on defining its most important part: an intentional killing. Part IV explores various legal applications of the word “intentional,” to demonstrate how differences in interpretation may affect the outcome. Part V presents a discussion of other state slayer statutes to demonstrate how these states have grappled with some (but not all) of the problems posed by triggering the rule through an intentional killing. Lastly, Part VI highlights the risks that New Jersey takes in relying on the word “intentional” without definition, and proposes a more comprehensive construction for New Jersey’s slayer statute.