Conditional Gift by Will
In his will, John Ellwood Hinebaugh provided that the area of land called Friend’s Delight should go to his friends, Donald and Charlotte Sebold, with the condition that they continue to farm the land. Upon their death, if they disclaimed the property, or if the failed to comply with the condition subsequent, Friend’s Delight passed “subject to the same conditions and covenants, to the State of Maryland, adding that said conditions [were] covenants running with the land.”(internal quotation omitted). The will also contained a residuary clause leaving the residue of the estate to certain beneficiaries, including Shelley Rodeheaver.
The Sebolds disclaimed their interest in Friend’s Delight. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, saying the alienation provision was invalid and the farming provision was unenforceable. The Sebolds originally opposed the motion but settled, so only Rodeheaver was left opposing the State’s motion. She said that if the State failed to farm the land, the property would pass to the residuary beneficiaries.
In Rodeheaver v. State, 2007 WL 656605 (Md. App. 2007), the Court of Special Appeals first noted that condition subsequents are disfavored in the law because they inhibit the free transfer of land, which the law favors, and require forfeiture when the condition isn’t met, which the law disfavors. Therefore, a testator’s language of intent in creating the condition had to be clear and unequivocal, specifically stating that there should be a reversion of the property to the grantor or that the property should pass to another person if the condition was not met. Otherwise, “the condition merely expresses the grantor’s confidence that the grantee will use the property so far as may be reasonable and practicable to effect the purpose of the grant.” (internal quotations omitted).
Here, there was a condition subsequent as to the Sebolds, because the will provided that the property would then pass to the State. However, the will did not specify to whom the property should pass, either through reversion or devise, if the State did not comply with the condition. Further, “even though [the testator] included a general residuary clause, the fact that he made no express provision for the property in the event the State fails to farm…leads to the conclusion that he did not intend to make the farming condition mandatory.” (internal quotations omitted). A general residuary beneficiary would only obtain the property if it first reverted to the grantor. Friend’s Delight did not revert to the grantor here because the farming condition was not mandatory on the State. Therefore, Rodeheaver and the other residuary beneficiaries were not entitled to the property.
Special thanks to Matthew B. Bogin (Rockville, Maryland) for bringing this article to my attention.