Language directing the devisees not to sell created life estates

The testatrix’s will gave real estate to her two daughters and stated that the real estate was not to be sold during the daughters’ lives and for twenty-one years thereafter. In addition, upon the daughters’ death, title was to vest in “the heirs of their bodies, per stirpes” but not to be sold for twenty-one years. The trial court held that the daughters held the land in fee simple because of the statutory presumption that all estates in land are presumed to be fee simple estates, the testatrix’s attempt to create a fee tail was void, and that the purported restriction on sale was void as an unlawful restraint on alienation. The appellate court reversed, holding that the statutory presumption was relevant only to deeds, that the will had to be construed to carry out the testatrix’s intent, and that in spite of the absence of express language, the testatrix intended to create a life estate in her daughters. Barnett v. Estate of Anderson, Nos. 1051676 & 1051829 2007 WL 779147 (Ala. Mar. 16, 2007).