Ademption Jurisprudence in Alabama

Raley L. Wiggins (J.D. 2010, cum laude, University of Alabama School of Law) recently published his note entitled Adeemed If You Do, Adeemed If You Don’t: The Testator’s Intent to Passively Revoke a Specific Devise, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 1163 (2010). An excerpt from the introduction is below:

The Alabama Supreme Court has considered ademption in a few widely-dispersed opinions ranging from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries. In its most recent decision in Parker v. Bozian, however, the court distinguished its current ademption analysis without overruling its prior holdings. In so doing, the court has cast a shadow of uncertainty across this narrow but important band of the law. Specifically, it is unclear when extrinsic evidence may be admitted to determine whether a particular action or non-action by a testator rises to the level of ademption. In fact, ademption may occur under this standard even where no affirmative action was taken by the testator to effectuate a change to or disposition of the property. This Note discusses the background and development of ademption jurisprudence in Alabama, and specifically examines how the Parker decision has expanded the limits of admissibility of extrinsic evidence in an ademption case, even where such evidence may essentially alter the substantive terms of a will.