The Georgia Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Slayer Statute in Levenson
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This Note criticizes the Georgia Supreme Court’s interpretation of the slayer statute in Levenson, asserting that its method of analysis is contrary to the equitable foundations of the slayer statute and clear legislative intention. The court’s interpretation provides dangerous policy incentives and invites unethical behavior. First, a murderer now has permission to pillage the deceased’s estate, either transferring this property to an adulterous partner or, as in the Levenson case, using the property to pay for a defense attorney.
Second, attorneys now have no legal duty to ascertain the propriety of money paid to them in fees. Ms. Post’s attorneys are responsible for knowing that Ms. Post would not be allowed to inherit from, or act as administrator of, her husband’s estate if convicted of murder or proven to have killed her husband by “clear and convincing evidence.” If the attorneys representing Ms. Post also knew of her murder charges, source of the fees, and that the State intended to pursue the death penalty, a judge or jury may conclude that they acted in bad faith and order that the fees be returned to the estate.
This Note proposes an ethical and legal framework for deciding future cases implicating a state’s slayer statute where clear statutory language does not exist for resolving particular factual situations. Courts faced with unclear statutory language should employ the equitable remedy of the constructive trust. This remedy will lead to outcomes that are more consistent with the equitable maxims underlying slayer statutes. Although it is argued that the adoption of slayer statutes has “obviated the need for courts to resort to the constructive trust,” the Levenson case demonstrates that this remedy is still needed. The constructive trust remedy should be employed when a slayer statute is ambiguous or when following the statutory language leads to absurd results.
Before criticizing the rationale and holding of Levenson v. Word, this Note highlights the development of the slayer rule, analyzing the rule from its foundation in English common law to its present state. Next, this Note discusses the adoption of this equitable doctrine in Georgia, up to and after the adoption of the Georgia slayer statute. This is then followed by a discussion of the Levenson case and the implications of this ruling on divestiture statutes. Then, several other methods for handling the Levenson fact pattern are surveyed, including how the Restatement and Uniform Probate Code resolve similar issues.
Next, this Note proposes an alternative framework for analyzing similar cases. The Georgia Supreme Court, with the current statutory language, should have created a constructive trust, effective at the time of the killing. This constructive trust serves as an “invaluable expedient[ ] for overcoming the rigidity of the law.”
Finally, this Note argues that in the alternative the Georgia legislature could amend the slayer statute to insure equitable outcomes in the future. This amendment could be modeled after the Restatement and Uniform Probate Code, which explicitly handle these factual scenarios and result in more equitable outcomes. “Whether by court or legislature, the Principle of Public Policy is the driving equitable force behind the slayer statute” and the court has summarily dismissed this notion in the Levenson ruling.
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